The US is unique.
Tax inversions result from the combination of fluid international trade and developed countries (like Switzerland and Ireland) sporting significantly lower corporate tax rates.
A trade deficit results from the US importing more than we export.
The adoption of border adjustments would appear initially to make a country more competitive in international trade. But any such effect is at most a temporary one.
To see this, consider first the case in which there is a single common currency, or a fixed exchange rate. Then consider a border adjustment by one country only; for the moment we consider only the impact of this border adjustment, abstracting from the other elements of the DBCFT.
Moving from an origin-based tax that included exports in the tax base, the border adjustment would make exports cheaper on the world market; this would create a stimulus to exports. By contrast, the domestic cost of imports would increase with the tax on imports; this would discourage imports. With a fixed exchange rate, and sticky wages, both effects would induce a stimulus to domestic activity.
This corresponds to the well-known effect of such border adjustments having the same impact as a currency devaluation – that is, in making exports cheaper to non-domestic consumers, and imports more expensive for domestic consumers. In the short run, this would generate a stimulus to domestic production relative to foreign production.
Over the longer run, however, we would expect prices to adjust. Expansion of domestic production would lead to an increase in the demand for labour.
This would in turn push up the wage rate, and in consequence, push up the price of domestically produced goods and services. The effect of this rise in prices and wages would be to begin to raise again the price of exports on the world market, and to raise the price of domestically-produced goods relative to imports.
When domestic prices and wages had risen far enough, the initial real equilibrium will be re-established. In this long run, there would be no overall impact on trade, due to the price adjustments. If instead the country had a flexible exchange rate, the same real long-run effect would occur naturally – and much more quickly, quite possibly indeed immediately (with some effect in advance if the change is pre-announced) – through an appreciation of the exchange rate, which would raise the (domestic currency) price of exports in the world market and reduce the price of imports. This would not require adjustment to the nominal price level in the domestic country.
In effect, the initial fiscal devaluation would immediately be offset by an appreciation of the currency – i.e. a revaluation; these two effects would cancel out, leaving trade unaffected. The nature of the adjustment — as between changes in domestic prices and wages, in the nominal exchange rate, and in the level of activity — will thus depend in practice on which of these can adjust more rapidly.”